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IMPORTATION CONTROL UNDER TARIFF ACT SECTION
526: TRADEMARK PRIVILEGES AND ANTITRUST POLICY*
SECTION 526 of the Tariff Act offers the American businessman who pur-
chases a foreign trademark a position comparable to that of the owner of an
American mark. Upon registration of his interest, the purchaser may control
all importation of authentic goods bearing the foreign mark.' This power to
*United States v. Guerlain, Inc., 155 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), probable jurisdic-
tion noted, 26 U.S.L. WE= 3229 (U.S. Feb. 4, 1958).
1. Subsection (a) of § 526 provides: "[I]t shall be unlawful to import into the United
States any merchandise of foreign manufacture if such merchandise . . . bears a trade-
mark owned by a citizen of, or by a corporation or association created or organized with-
in, the United States ... unless written consent of the owner of such trade-mark is pro-
duped at the time of making entry." 46 STAT. 741. (1930), 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a) (1952).
To prevent importation under the section, the American purchaser must register the
trademark with the Patent Office and file a copy of the certificate with the Treasury
Department. Ibid.; 19 C.F.R. § 11.15 (1954) (Customs Regulations). For a general
description of the procedures involved, see Note, 64 YALE L.J. 557 (1955).
In addition to § 526, § 42 of the Lanham Trade-Mark Act provides: "[N]o article of
imported merchandise . . . which shall copy or simulate a trade-mark registered in ac-
cordance with the provisions of this chapter ... shall be admitted to entry at any custom-
house of the United States." 60 STAT. 440 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (1952), re-enacting §
27 of the Trade-Mark Act of 1905, c. 592, 33 STAT. 730. Although § 42 uses the term "copy
or simulate," authentic goods can be excluded under this section since they may also in-
fringe the domestically owned trademark. See A. Bourjois & Co. v. Aldridge, 263 U.S.
675 (1.923), deciding questions certified in 292 Fed. 1013 (2d Cir. 1922) (based on § 27).
For the differences between § 526 and § 42, see Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the
Senate Committee on Patents on, H.R. 82, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 83-90 (1944) ; Derenberg,
The Impact of the Antitrust Laws on Trade-Marks in Foreign Commerce, 27 N.Y.U.L.
Ray. 414, 424-27 (1952).
These provisions have been used to exclude spurious goods and inferior imitations, see,
e.g., Le Blume Import Co. v. Coty, 293 Fed. 344 (2d Cir. 1923) (perfume) ; Eternit, Inc.
v. J. J. Clarke Co., 18 F.2d 607 (E.D. La. 1927) (dictum; asbestos shingle), and to bar
importation solely for personal use, Sturges v. Clark D. Pease, Inc., 48 F.2d 1035 (2d Cir.
1931) (secondhand foreign automobile). Although the section is available against return-
ing American tourist imports, its effectiveness in such situations has been questioned. See
Bulova Watch Co. v. Steele, 194 F.2d 567, 572 (5th Cir. 1952) (dictum). In any event,
trademark owners have in many instances consented to tourist importation on a limited
basis. See, e.g., United States v. Guerlain, Inc., 155 F. Supp. 77, 90, 93, 97 (S.D.N.Y.
1.957).
Section 526 stems from continued dissatisfaction with judicial treatment of trademarks.
For example, in 1886, a purchaser of the exclusive American rights to a trademark of
foreign manufactured products was not allowed to bring an infringement action against
competing distributors importing trademarked goods purchased abroad. Apollinaris Co. v.
Scherer, 27 Fed. 18 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886). Congress responded with § 27 of the Trade-
Mark Act of 1905, the predecessor of § 42 of the Lanham Act. But this section originally
gave only limited protection, since a literal interipretation was accorded the term "copy
or simulate," with the result that only spurious goods could be excluded. Hunyadi Janos
Corp. v. Stoeger, 285 Fed. 861 (2d Cir. 1922) ; Fred Gretsch Mfg. Co. v. Schoening, 238
exclude unauthorized imports was deemed necessary to protect the American
purchaser from fraud or breach of contract by the foreign vendor against
whom traditional legal remedies might be ineffective. 2 Moreover, by allowing
exclusion of trademarked goods sold in good faith to third parties, section 526
Fed. 780 (2d Cir. 1916). Moreover, the Second Circuit, in A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel,
275 Fed. 539 (2d Cir. 1921), extended its Fred Gretsch holding to deny an infringement
action brought by the American owner of face powder trademarks against a distributor
who had purchased from the French manufacturing firm and resold in this country in the
original French boxes. Although an appeal was taken to the Supreme Court, American
owners did not rely on judicial reversal. For shortly after the circuit court opinion had
been rendered and a rehearing denied, and before the Supreme Court could have had an
opportunity to hear argument, remedial legislation in the form of § 526 was introduced
in the Senate. 62 CONG. REc_ 11383 (1922). It was passed by the Congress four days
later. Id. at 11605. That the purpose of this amendment was to override the Second Cir-
cuit decision is clear from the limited discussion on the floor of the Senate, id. at 11602-
05; Conference Report on the Tariff Act, H.R. REP. No. 1223, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. 158
(1922), and subsequent judicial discussion, see Sturges v. Clark D. Pease, Inc., supra at
1037 (Judge Augustus N. Hand) ; Le Blume Import Co. v. Coty, supra at 269 (Judge
Learned Hand). Ironically, the Supreme Court, after considerable delay, rendered § 526
unnecessary by reversing the lower court decision, A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 260 U.S.
639 (1923), and ruling that exclusion as well as infringement would lie, A. Bourjois &
Co. v. Aldridge, supra.
2. 62 CONG. REc. 11603 (1922) (such protection sole purpose of section).
Since, absent § 526, an infringement action against the importation of authentic goods
seemed unavailable to the American owner, see note 1 supra, the sole remedy appeared
to lie in contract. Apparently, the sponsors feared American courts' inability to exercise
jurisdiction over foreign vendors refraining from personally doing business in this country.
For example, if the manufacturer chose to deal with third par-ties who were unaware of
a prior American purchase of the trademark, the American would be unable to sue suc-
cessfully in this country. The third parties would be protected as innocent bona fide pur-
chasers. See 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACrs § 1453 (rev. ed. 1937). See also RESTATEmENT,
TORTS § 766 (1939) (not liable in tort for inducing breach) ; 1 HAlPER & JAMES, TORTS
§§ 6.5-.10 (1956) (same); RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 1 (1933) (not agent of foreign ven-
dor) ; MFECHAM, AGENCY § 12 (4th ed. 1952) (same). And the manufacturer would be
beyond the court's jurisdiction since service on the distributor would not constitute service
on him unless an agency relationship were established. 2 Mooma, FEDERAL PRACTICE
§§ 4.12-.15, 4.17, 4.22 (2d ed. 1948). See also Note, 56 YALE L.J. 396 (1947).
Of course, should the foreign firm breach the agreement by itself selling in the United
States, a suit would probably lie. See Hunyadi Janos Corp. v. Stoeger, supra note 1, at
864 (dictum) ; Apollinaris Co. v. Scherer, supra note 1, at 20 (same). For a discussion of
"doing business" problems, see 2 MooRE, op. cit. supra at § 4.25; 2 RABELz, CONFuCT OF
LAWS 173-225 (1947) (conflict of laws aspects).
And, in either case, the possibility of suing the foreign vendor in his home courts re-
mained. But the dangers of delay, high costs and partiality, as well as ignorance of for-
eign procedural and substantive law, rendered such a course undesirable. For a general
discussion of contract enforcement in foreign nations, see 2 RABEL, op. cit. supra at 357-91;
Lorenzen, Validity and Effects of Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 30 YALE L.J. 565,
655 (1921). Furthermore, the contract might be held unenforceable as a restraint of
trade or an illegal restraint on alienation. For a review of European antitrust legislation
and discussion of prevailing attitudes toward its extraterritorial application, see Haight,
Antitrust Laws and the Territorial Principle, 11 VAND. L. REv. 27 (1957). See also
Morrison, Commercial Restrictions in English Law, 11 id. at 1.
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enables the American vendee to impose and enforce restrictions on alienation
which may be prohibited by foreign law.3 While trademarks have been sup-
ported as fostering competition,4 these exceptional powers bestowed by the
3. Thus, absent § 526, the domestic trademark owner might be unable to prevent im-
portation despite co-operation by the foreign vendor. To insure such exclusions, the manu-
facturer would have to contract with all distributors purchasing from him that they would
not undertake to penetrate the American market. If such contract provisions were en-
forceable where made, the American firm might be protected as a third-party beneficiary
or through direct action by the foreign manufacturer. On third-party beneficiary contracts
generally, see 4 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 772-855 (1951) ; 2 WILLISTON, CoNTcrs §§ 347-
403 (rev. ed. 1936). But foreign antitrust restrictions could block a manufacturer's suit.
See note 2 supra. And protection would also fail if beneficiary suits were unavailable.
See, on the status of English law, Williams, Contracts for the Benefit of Third Parties,
7 MOD. L. REv. 123 (1944) ; Corbin, Contracts for the Benefit of Third Persons, 46 LAW
Q. Rxv. 12 (1930); 4 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 836-54 (1951); 2 Wn.LISTON, CONTRACrS
88 360-61 (rev. ed. 1936). See also Williston, Contracts for the Benefit of a Third Person
in the Civil Law, 16 HARv. L. REv. 43 (1902).
4. The prevailing school of trademark supporters emphasizes that a mark indicating
the origin of the goods enables the consumer to distinguish between competing producers.
For the "source of ownership or origin" rationale, see, e.g., Kellogg Co. v. National
Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938) ; Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403,
412 (1916) ; Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 311, 324 (1871). See also ROBERT, THE
NEW TRADE-MARK MANUAL 4-6 (1947) ; Rogers, The Lanhanz Act and the Social Func-
tion of Trade-Marks, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROD. 173, 175-76 (1949); Leeds, Trade-
marks-Our Amverican Concept, 46 TADE-MARK REP. 1451, 1453 (1956). This in turn,
the argument runs, fosters competition by permitting an informed choice based on the
quality of the product as measured by past experience. See, e.g., Avrick v. Rockmont
Envelope Co., 155 F.2d 568 (10th Cir. 1946); Shredded Wheat Co. v. Humphrey Cor-
nell Co., 250 Fed. 960 (2d Cir. 1918). See also Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Mishawaka
Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S. S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942): "The pro-
tection of trade-marks is the law's recognition of the psychological function of symbols.
If it is true that we live by symbols, it is no less true that we purchase goods by them.
A trademark is a merchandising short-cut which induces a purchaser to select what he
wants, or what he has been led to believe he wants. The owner of a mark exploits this
human propensity by making every effort to impregnate the atmosphere of the market
with the drawing power of a congenial symbol. Whatever the means employed, the end
is the same-to convey through the mark, in the minds of the potential customers, the
desirability of the commodity upon which it appears. Once this is attained, the trade-mark
owner has something of value. If another poaches upon the commercial magnetism of the
symbol he has created, the owner can obtain legal redress."
But critics argue that consumer behavior is more often characterized by ignorance,
unconcern and irrationality. See Timberg, Trade-Marks, Monopoly, and the Restraint of
Competition, 14 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 323, 325-26 (1949) ; Brown, Advertising and the
Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1167 (1948);
cf. United States v. Guerlain, Inc., 155 F. Supp. 77, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). Moreover, they
contend that trademarking permits monopolistic pricing by isolating to varying degrees
the marked product. CHAmBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMrPErITION 57-65,
68-71, 270-74 (7th ed. 1956).
Other advocates, while admitting that trademark protection restrains some forms of
competition, argue that such safeguarding of the owner's goodwill promotes effective
competition in the long run. See Isaacs, Traffic in Trade-Symzbols, 44 HARV. L. REv. 1210
(1931) ; Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARv. L. REV. 813
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Tariff Act have been severely criticized for abetting domestic monopolies. 5
In the recent case of United States v. Guerlain, Inc., a federal district court
responding to this criticism narrowed the scope of section 526 and concluded
(1927). But goodwill in this context has traditionally meant reputation, which can be
preserved by protection against inferior goods. See A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 260 U.S.
689, 692 (1923); Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Rohrlich, 167 F.2d 969, 972 (2d Cir.
1948); 1 Nims, UNFAIR CO,.1PETITION AND TRADE-MARKS 73 (4th ed. 1947); Rogers,
supra at 176. To justify expansion of trademark protection beyond these limits, therefore,
proponents have argued the necessity of preserving "property" and insuring future profits.
See, e.g., Callman, Unfair Competition Without Competition? The Importance of the
Property Concept in the Law of Trade-Marks, 95 U. PA. L. RaV. 443 (1947) ; Schechter,
supra; cf. Mulhens & Kropff, Inc. v. Ferd Muelhens, Inc., 38 F.2d 287, 292 (S.D.N.Y.
1929); Note, 64 YALE L.J. 557, 563-64 n.37 (1955); Timberg, supra at 326 n.10 (con-
cluding that less enthusiasm for the protection of property derived through advertising
can be found among jurists than among legal writers, and that courts still tend to favor
the source of origin theory). This property rationale, however, fails to offer economic
justification of trademarks as legal privileges by overlooking interests other than pri-
vate enrichment. See Brown, supra (criticizing trademarks from an economic point of
view); cf. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 CoLum.
L. REV. 809, 814-17 (1935) (circular to afford legal protection on the basis of economic
value when the economic value depends upon the extent of legal protection). Compare,
generally, Diggins, Trade-Marks and Restraints of Trade, 32 GEo. L.J. 113 (1944) ; Tim-
berg, supra (trademarks restrict trade and cause monopoly), with Taggart, Trade-Marks:
Monopoly or Competition?, 43 lic. L. REv. 659 (1945) ; Wright, Sone Pitfalls of
Economic Theory as a Guide to the Law of Competition, 37 VA. L. REv. 1083 (1951) ;
Oppenheim, The Public Interest in the Legal Protection of Industrial and Intellectual
Property, 40 TRDE-MARK REP. 613 (1950); Patishall, Trade-Marks and the Monopoly
Phobia, 50 MIcH. L. REv. 967 (1952) (trademarks in public interest as fostering com-
petition). For a contrasting of judicial attitude on trademarks and their effect upon com-
petition, see Note, 64 YALE L.J. 557, 564-65 nn.39 & 40 (1955).
5. See, generally, Note, 64 YALE L.J. 557 (1955). See also Sturges v. Clark D. Pease,
Inc., 48 F.2d 1035, 1037 (2d Cir. 1.931) (§ 526 a "drastic" device).
Various administrative efforts have been made over the years to restrict the scope of
trademark exclusion rights. As early as 1937, treasury regulations provided that if the
domestically registered and the alleged infringing mark were owned by the same foreign
enterprise, the latter would not be deemed to "copy or simulate" the American mark. 2
FEn. REG. 1572 (1937). This brought § 42 into line with § 526 which specifically provides that
only domestically owned marks may be registered. See note 1 supra. In 1954, the Treasury
Department denied the benefits of § 526 to "related" firms, 19 C.F.R. §§ 11.14-.17 (1954),
defined by § 45 of the Lanham Act to mean any firm which controls or is controlled by
the foreign firm with respect to the "nature and quality" of the goods. 60 STAT. 443
(1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1952). For a general discussion of this regulation together
with a review of recent legislative attempts to prevent "affiliate" companies from using
§ 526, see Note, 64 YALE L.J. 557, 559-60 (1955). A statute, repealing § 526 and amend-
ing § 42, was reported favorably by the Senate Judiciary Committee as part of the Wiley
Bill to amend the Lanham Act. S. REP,. No. 2266, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 6, 9 (1954). But
this provision was, along with the House version, withdrawn so that the Treasury De-
partment and the Administration could further consider the proposal. Note, 64 YALE L.J.
557, 560 n.17 (1955). Criticism of § 526 rests on the implicit assumption that the section
creates an exception to the antitrust laws by permitting exclusions regardless of the
domestic effects. But see note 34 infra.
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that trademarks might constitute an illegal monopoly.6 Defendant, exclusive
American distributor for a French perfume manufacturer, had registered the
trademarks on various perfumes and toiletries and prevented other purchasers
from importing the trademarked goods.7 The court found defendant part of a
single international enterprise and denied the privileges of section 526 on the
ground that they were available only to independent American trademark
owners.8 In so construing the section, it specifically rejected the notion that
Congress had created an implied exception to the Sherman Act for the benefit
of an American affiliate of an international organization. 9 Turning to the
more complex problem of monopolization, the court assumed that no inter-
changeability or cross-elasticity existed between defendant's goods and com-
peting nontrademarked products. Apparently envisioning a similar relation-
ship for other trademarked goods, it defined the relevant market as defend-
ant's imports. 10 The market thus delimited, the court ruled that defendant
possessed and exercised monopoly power, arising in part through intentional
exclusion of all competition under section 526."' Monopoly power so derived
was held to violate section two of the Sherman Act.1 2
The court's narrow definition of the relevant market has little basis in law
or fact.13 No consideration was given to the possibilities of price or nonprice
6. 155 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), probable jurisdiction noted, 26 U.S.L. WEEK
3229 (U.S. Feb. 4, 1958). The government brought separate suits against three American
companies, Guerlain, Parfums Corday and Lanvin Parfums, which were consolidated for
trial. 155 F. Supp. at 79. After the unfavorable decree, a direct appeal was taken to the
Supreme Court under the Expediting Act, 32 STAT. 823 (1903), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 29 (1952). A fourth action resulted in a consent decree. United States v. Empro Corp.,
1954 Trade Cas. 1 67778 (S.D.N.Y.).
7. 155 F. Supp. at 79. The government did not challenge the right of defendant to register
the trademarks with the Patent Office but asserted that utilization of the exclusion provision
was without foundation. Ibid.; see note 33 infra.
8. 155 F. Supp. at 80-83. For a discussion of the court's definition of "single enterprise,"
see note 28 infra.
9. 155 F. Supp. at 83.
10. Id. at 83-87.
11. Id. at 87.
12. Ibid.
13. See id. at 84-85. Nor can the statement that no evidence was offered "on the
responsiveness of the sales of one product to the price changes of another" serve the
purpose. Id. at 85. Even if this refers to the interbrand response, it neglects the fact
that the burden of proof rested upon the government to establish the relevant market as
an essential element in its monopolization allegation. See note 16 infra. Moreover, de-
fendant's unrebutted evidence that 75% of all perfume is purchased as gifts for third per-
sons, that the salesgirl possesses great influence in directing consumers' selection and that
there are numerous nationally exploited trademarks casts doubt on the hypothesis of no
interbrand competition. The court ignored the Cellophane Case formula requiring ex-
amination of demand cross-elasticity between defendant's and alleged substitute products.
See United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956). It instead
assumed that, despite the admitted objective interchangeability of various perfumes, the
absence of objectivity in consumer behavior resulted in a complete lack of competi-
tion and an insensitivity to price variation. 155 F. Supp. at 84-85. For discussion
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competition between defendant's goods and other trademarked products.I 4 And
a factual inquiry into the availability of nontrademarked substitutes was no-
critical of the Guerlah market definition, see Notes, 71 HARv. L. REv. 564 (1958),
56 MICH. L. REv. 309 (1957), 43 VA. L. REv. 1123 (1957). For evaluation of
the Cellophane Case, see Turner, Antitrust Policy and the Cellophane Case, 70
HARv. L. REV. 281 (1956); Stocking & Mueller, The Cellophane Case and the
New Competition, 45 Am. EcoN. REv. 29, 48-49 (1955); Marcus, Antitrust Bugbears:
Substitute Products-Olgopoly, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 185 (1956) ; Dirlam & Stelzer, The
Cellophane Labyrinth, 1 ANTITRUST BULL. 633 (1956). On the problems of relevant
markets generally, see REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE To
STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 44-48 ('1955) (hereinafter cited as AiTfY GEN. REP.);
Macdonald, Product Competition in the Relevant Market Under the Sherman Act, 53
MicH. L. REv. 69 (1954); Note, 54 CoLum. L. REv. 580 (1954). See also Note, 43 VA.
L. REv. 1123, 1124 n.7, 1125 n.15 (1957) (collecting cases defining a variety of relevant mar-
kets). More recent cases include Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., 243
F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir. 1957), reversing 135 F. Supp. 4 (D.D.C. 1955), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
822 (1957) ; Schwing Motor Co. v. Hudson Sales Corp., 138 F. Supp. 899 (D. Md.), aff'd,
per curiam, 239 F.2d 176 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 8-3 (1957). See also
Arthur v. Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp., 26 F. Supp. 824 (D. Md. 1937) (monopoly of
Kraft cheese and mayonnaise not a Sherman Act violation).
14. Nonprice competition appears in various guises, one of which, product differen-
tiation, was employed in Guerlain. Where product differentiation takes the form of
genuine differences in the goods, it affords the consumer something of value. Rowe, Price
Differentials and Product Differentiation, 66 YALE L.J. 32-33 (1956) ; Note, 66 id. at 243,
253-54. But where the sole distinction is one of labeling, exploited through extensive
advertising, the buyer is often purchasing prestige rather than value. Brown, supra note
4, at 1167-84. See also ATFY GEN. REP. 157-58, 330-31 (approving product differentiation at
least where embodying genuine innovation) ; BAIN, PRICING, DISTRmUTION, AND EMPLOY-
MENT 24 (rev. ed. 1953) (factors such as design, quality, packaging, sales promotion and
advertising serve to distinguish goods).
The perfume industry would appear to be a clear example of the labeling type of
product differentiation, for no real difference may exist among various perfumes. The
difficulty with applying standard analysis, however, is that the perfume buyer is unique.
What he really wants is not price competition but the prestige which attaches to higher
cost perfumes. BORDEN, THE EcoNomic EEPEcrs OF ADvERTISING 583 (1942); GORDON,
ECON MICS FOR THE CONSUMER 250 (3d ed. 1950). That so much money is expended an-
nually by the perfume companies in advertising buttresses this conclusion and the theory
that workable, though nonprice, competition does exist in the industry. On workable
competition generally, see ATT'Y GEN. REP. 318-39; Oppenheim, Federal Antitrust Legis-
lation: Guideposts to a Revised National Antitrust Policy, 50 MICH. L. REv. 1139, 1.183-
84 n.117 (1952) (collecting articles). For other examples of nonprice competition, see
FELLNER, COMPTIMTION AmONG THE FmV 183-91 (1949); Clark, Toward a Concept of
Workable Competition, 30 Am. EcoN. REP. 241, 253 (1940); Note, 66 YALE LJ. 243,
252-55 (1956).
Nonprice competition is standard practice in those industries which are dominated by
a few large and powerful firms. Open price cutting in such oligopolistic markets is eco-
nomic suicide. See Note, 66 YALE LJ. 1251, 1252-53 n.5 (1957) (collecting authorities).
In decisions involving oligopolistic industries, courts have generally held that the
existence of other forms of competition does not justify the lack of price competition.
National Lead Co. v. FTC, 227 F.2d 825, 834 (7th Cir. 1955), rezvd in part on other
grounds, 352 U.S. 419 (1957); see United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S.
150, 220 (1940). But all of these cases dealt with a market situation in which
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tably lacking.15 Admittedly, a defendant asserting interindustry substitutes
as a defense to monopolization charges may have to prove reasonable inter-
changeability. When trademarks constitute the only alleged difference between
the products, however, the government should at least bear the burden of
negating cross-elasticity. 16 Nevertheless, the court justified stringent market
customers sought price competition. Since the perfume industry is atypical, the precedents
are not directly applicable. Thus, if effective nonprice competition permeates the per-
fume industry and if the buyer is satisfied with such a system, no reason for ordering
price competition appears. Nevertheless, should the nonprice competition represent a
significant barrier to entry, the courts might find it undesirable as strengthening existing
oligopoly power. See American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 797 (1946) :
"Such advertising is not here criticized as a business expense. Such advertising may benefit
indirectly the entire industry, including the competitors of the advertisers. Such tremendous
advertising, however, is also a widely published warning that these companies possess and
know how to use a powerful offensive and defensive weapon against new competition.
New competition dare not enter such a field, unless it be well supported by comparable
national advertising." Such advertising barriers to entry seem unlikely in the perfume
industry where 90 different manufacturers sell over 408 perfumes and 61 sell toilet goods
within defendant's price range. 155 F. Supp. at 84 n.22 (Guerlain, Corday and Lanvin
account respectively for 3.5, 2 and 6% of the retail sales of similar priced toilet articles).
By contrast, in the cigarette industry at the time of the American Tobacco case, the three
leading producers accounted for 68-75% of national production and only six other firms
offered any competition. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, supra at 794.
1.5. The court, using terms of legal conclusion, made no examination of actual market
behavior and assumed a priori that an unexploited and unmarked product could not affect
the sales of defendant's highly exploited trademarks. 155 F. Supp. at 85. While the
result might in fact be correct, an unproved assumption should not be used, as it was, to
shift the burden of proof on cross-elasticity of demand to the defendant. See note 16 infra.
16. Despite the plethora of antitrust decisions in which market delineation was crucial,
there is a surprising dearth of opinion on the burden of proof problem. Generally the
reference is made, if at all, to the government's burden of establishing the offense alleged.
See, e.g., Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 US. 594, 622 (1953);
United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 507-08 (1948) ; United States v. Alu-
minum Co., 14& F.2d 416, 423, 427 (2d Cir. 1945). It has been argued, on the basis of
these references, that prior to the Cellophane Case the burden was upon the government
to eliminate "fungible substitutes," presumably by showing a distinct cost advantage,
Turner, supra note 13, at 296-97, but if the products were physically dissimilar
defendant had to show a substantial degree of substitutability at the given prices in ad-
dition to proving the absence of high "cost preference" margins, ibid. At times, even this
defense would be insufficient since lack of cost advantage might reflect the stagnation
which competition was designed to prevent. Ibid. Statements in the Cellophane Case to
the effect that the "burden of proof ... was upon the Government to establish monopoly,"
United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 381 (1956), add little
to an understanding of the problem. An examination of that case might, however, justify
the conclusion that once the government has introduced evidence as to the relevant mar-
ket, the burden of going forward shifts to the defendant. And only if he comes forward
with a substitutability defense would the government be required to do more than show
physical dissimilarity. Once, however, such evidence was introduced, the ability to ex-
clude other sellers would have to be proved by the government. Turner, supra note 13, at
303. The dissent is considered to argue that the burden of proof and of going forward
must be placed upon a defendant arguing substitutability. Ibid.
The mistake of both approaches, so construed, is the failure to distinguish between
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definition by relying on commentators' claims that delineation varies with the
nature of the offense.17 It stated that the relevant market has been narrowly
defined for attempts and conspiracies while in those monopolization cases in
which defendants are comparatively free of preclusive design, a broader defini-
tion has been allowed.' Analogizing Guerlain to an attempt case, however
successful, the court found the specific intent to monopolize supporting strict
matters of allegation and matters of proof. While the government cannot be burdened
with the task of negating all substitutability, it should be required to establish the absence
of certain fundamental interchangeability. Thus, in Guerlain, the government should
have to show that trademarked perfumes do not compete among themselves while the
trademark owner would have to establish cross-elasticity between such products as per-
fumes and toilet waters.
17. 155 F. Supp. at 85-86, relying on Turner, supra note 13, at 304: "(1) Attempts
and Conspiracies.-Monopoly is control over any appreciable amount of commerce,
even though that amount is not a market in any meaningful economic sense. (2) Com-
binations.-Monopoly is control over a market from which qualitatively distinct substitutes
are prima facie (and possibly conclusively) excluded. (3) Individual Mwwpolizing.-
Monopoly is control over a market in which qualitatively distinct substitutes are included
(either prima facie or conclusively) once it is shown that they are reasonably interchange-
able." For discussion of the Turner thesis, see note 18 infra.
18. 155 F. Supp. at 85-86. Reliance was also placed on the Cellophane Case and cases
cited therein. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 395 n.23
(1956).
The principal difficulty with this analysis is that the economic ends sought by antitrust
enforcement are apt to be obscured if suit is made to turn upon conduct rather than effect.
In a sense, the approach reincarnates the concept, long considered buried, of "good" and
"bad" trusts. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945).
While antitrust law does curtail objectionable trade practices through statutory pro-
visions and judicial fiat, the policy behind the law is one of eliminating barriers to free
exchange and insuring competitive market structure. See Note, 66 YALa L.J. 1251 n.2
(1957) (collecting examples of proscribed practices). Admittedly, the market definitions
will vary as to product and geographic delineation with the offense alleged. See United
States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 508 (1948) (merger as unreasonable restraint
and attempt to monopolize) ; ef. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S.
594, 611 (1953) (contract as unreasonable restraint and attempt to monopolize) ; United
States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271, 291 (6th Cir. 1898) (combination as
unreasonable restraint) ; United States v. Aluminum Co., supra (monopolization) ; United
States v. Klearflax Linen Looms, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 32, 33 (D. Minn. 1945) (same). See
also United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., supra; Note, 43 VA. L. REv. 1123,
1124 n.7, 1125 n.15 (1957) (collecting cases). But the variety of market definitions reached
in these cases was not attributable to the relative social objectionability of the offense.
Rather, the key to market definition was the likelihood of anticompetitive effects.
Nor does the narrow market definition necessarily imply greater probability of viola-
tion. If defendant is extremely powerful in an industry but has small independent com-
petitors in either product or geographic distribution, a broader market delineation in-
creases the chances of violation. Cf. Transamerica Corp. v. Federal Reserve System, 206
F.2d 163 (3d Cir. 1953) (business of commercial banks is local and hence control over
alleged five-state relevant market not a violation of § 7 of the Clayton Act); United
States v. Aluminum Co., supra (inclusion of product sold to own fabricating plants for
purposes of broadening relevant market). Thus, gearing the narrowness of the market
to the social undesirability of the practices alleged may be self-defeating.
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market categorization in defendant's assertion of section 526 powers.19 But
good-faith utilization of a privilege previously acknowledged as legal should
not be deemed an unlawful intent to monopolize.2 0 Significantly, after finding
a section tvo violation,21 the court took no positive measures to insure com-
19. The court concluded that, while utilization of § 526 was not "illegal in the sense
of immoral, predatory and bad faith," it was not "'honestly industrial' in that [it was]
actuated solely by a desire to prevent competition." 155 F. Supp. at 85. Since the court
deemed defendant's intentional and illegal exclusions of competition a specific intent to
monopolize, it felt justified in analogizing attempt and conspiracy cases to apply a narrow
market delineation. Id. at 85-86.
20. Antitrust courts have distinguished between "specific intent" and the element of
"deliberateness." ATTY GEN. REP. 55-56. The more stringent standard of specific intent
is required in cases such as attempts and conspiracies in which the offense has not been
consummated. Where the offense alleged is monopolization, however, no specific intent
need be proved. Compare Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the Court in Swift & Co. v.
United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905) ("Where acts are not sufficient in themselves to
produce a result which the law seeks to prevent-for instance, the monopoly-but require
further acts in addition to the mere forces of nature to bring that result to pass, an intent
to bring it to pass is necessary in order to produce a dangerous probability that it will
happen. . .. But when that intent and the consequent dangerous probability exist, this
statute, like many others and like the common law in some cases, directs itself against
that dangerous probability as well as the completed result."), with United States v. Alu-
minum Co., 148 F.2d 416, 431-32 (2d Cir. 1945). Although specific intent is unnecessary
in monopolization cases, it was utilized in Giterlain to restrict the market definition. See
note 19 supra. But the unreasonableness of finding specific intent to monopolize from
mere invocation of § 526 becomes apparent in light of the government's long acquiescence.
Cf. Glenn Coal Co. v. Dickinson Fuel Co., 72 F.2d 885 (4th Cir. 1934) (trademark regis-
tration does not equal an intent to monopolize) ; Merrimac Hat Corp. v. Crown Overall
Mfg. Co., 91 F. Supp. 49 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), aff'd, 186 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1951) (mere
registration and assertion of trademark rights do not tend unlawfully to restrain com-
petition or create a monopoly and do not violate the Sherman Act). Compare the conduct
offered to prove intent in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 42-43, 72-77
(1911) ; American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 789-97 (1946), with United
States v. Guerlain, Inc., 155 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). On the general argument
that new antitrust interpretations should be given prospective effect only, compare Toolson
v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953) ; Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U.S. 267, 276
(1951) (dissenting opinion), with Turner, supra note 13, at 314 n.77.
21. If a narrow market could be factually justified without relying on the Turner
thesis, note 17 supra, defendant would appear to have monopolized. For unlike attempt
and conspiracy cases, monopolization requires no specific intent. What is needed at most
is the possession and exercise of monopoly power. See United States v. Aluminum Co.,
supra note 20, at 432: "In order to fall within § 2, the monopolist must have both
the power to monopolize and the intent to monopolize. To read the passage as de-
manding any 'specific intent' makes nonsense of it, for no monopolist monopolizes uncon-
scious of what he is doing. So here, 'Alcoa' meant to keep, and did keep, that complete
and exclusive hold upon the ingot market with which it started. That was to 'monopolize'
that market, however innocently it otherwise proceeded." See also United States v. Grif-
fith, 334 U.S. 100, 105-08 (1948) ; American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781,
813-14 (1946) (quoting at length from Judge Hand's Alcoa opinion). Courts have dis-
agreed on what if anything beyond existence of power is needed to violate § 2. See United
States v. Patten, 187 Fed. 664, 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), ree'd on other grounds, 226 U.S. 525
(1913) ("It is not necessary that the power thus obtained should be exercised. Its exist-
ills [Vol. 67
1958] NOTES 1119
petition 22 but contented itself with enjoining use of section 526,23 a restriction
ence is sufficient."); American Tobacco Co. v. United States, supra at 811 ("The au-
thorities support the view that the material consideration in determining whether a mo-
nopoly exists is not that prices are raised and that competition actually is excluded but
that power exists to raise prices or to exclude competition when it is desired to do so.") ;
United States v. Griffith, supra at 107 ("So it is that monopoly power, whether lawfully
or unlawfully acquired, may itself constitute an evil and stand condemned under § 2 even
though it remains unexercised. For § 2 of the Act is aimed, inter alia, at the acquisition
or retention of effective market control.") ; United States v. United States Steel Corp.,
251 U.S. 417, 451 (1920) (dictum: "[T]he law does not make mere size an offense or the
existence of unexerted power an offense. It, we repeat, requires overt acts and trusts to
its prohibition of them and its power to repress or punish them.") ; United States v. In-
ternational Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693, 708 (1927) (same) ; United States v. Swift & Co.,
286 U.S. 106, 116 (1932) ("Mere size . .. is not an offense against the Sherman Act
unless magnified to the point at which it amounts to a monopoly ... but size carries with
it an opportunity for abuse that is not to be ignored when the opportunity is proved to
have been utilized in the past."). Perhaps the most authoritative judicial statement is
found in United States v. Aluminum Co., supra note 20, at 424: "That percentage
[ninety] is enough to constitute a monopoly; it is doubtful whether sixty or sixty-
four percent would be enough; and certainly thirty-three is -not." See also id. at 429-30:
"It does not follow because 'Alcoa' had such a monopoly, that it 'monopolized' the ingot
market: it may not have achieved monopoly; monopoly may have been thrust upon it ....
This notion has usually been expressed by saying that size does not determine guilt: that
there must be some 'exclusion' of competitors; that the growth must be something else
than 'natural' or 'normal'; that there must be a 'wrongful intent,' or some other specific
intent; or that some 'unduly' coercive means must be used. . . . What engendered these
compunctions is reasonably plain; persons may unwittingly find themselves in possession
of a monopoly, automatically so to say: that is, without having intended either to put an
end to existing competition, or to prevent competition from arising when none had
existed; they may become monopolists by force of accident." See, generally, Rostow,
Monopoly Unidcr the Sherman Act: Power or Purpose?, 43 ILL. L. REv. 745 (1949)
Adelman, Effective Competition and the Antitrust Laws, 61 HARV. L. REv. 1289 (1943)
Kahn, A Legal and Economic Appraisal of the "New" Sherinan and Clayton Acts, 63
YALE L.J. 293 (1954).
22. The court could have ordered dissolution of the exclusive territorial distributor-
ship. While enforcement difficulties exist in attempting dissolution, the barriers are not
insurmountable. The problem lies in the fact that the directing force of the arrangement,
the French manufacturer, is outside the court's jurisdiction. See note 2 supra. See also
Note, 56 YALE L.J. 396 (1947). Thus, a decree dissolving the particular arrangement
could not force the manufacturer to sell to other distributors. Even should the court by
some means secure jurisdiction over the foreign concern and apply antitrust sanctions,
continued enforcement would present problems. For the unsuccessful attempt by one
American court to meet this problem, see United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries,
Ltd., 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), and British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v. Imperial
Chemical Industries, Ltd., [1952] 2 All E.R. 780, 784 (C.A.), aff'd, [1955] 1 Ch. 37 (re-
fusal to enforce American decree in so far as it affected British nationals dealing in Eng-
land). See Notes, 42 CoRNELL L.Q. 390, 395 (1957), 26 FoRDHAM L. REv. 319 (1957).
See also ATr'y GEN. REP. 65-114. But continued prosecutions against local exclusive
dealers would insure against the substance of an exclusive agency even where no direct
action is possible against the foreign firm.
Alternatively, public licensing of the trademark might have been required, in much
the same manner as in patent cases. The remedial provisions there considered are, in
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presumably unnecessary in light of the ruling that defendant could not invoke
the section.2 4 While the decree is so limited, antitrust penalties could ensue
through treble damage suits by competitors.2 5 Were defendant's good-faith
ascending order of severity: (1) compulsory licensing at reasonable rates; (2) compul-
sory licensing on a royalty-free basis; and (3) public dedication. ATr'Y GEN. REP. 255.
The trademark equivalent of public dedication has been principally used when the mark
and the product coalesce and the general product is identified and designated by the specific
trademark appellation. In such instances, the trademark is no longer valid. See, e.g.
Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938) (shredded wheat) ; Coca-Cola
Co. v. Standard Bottling Co., 133 F.2d 788 (10th Cir. 1943) (cola) ; Dupont Cellophane
Co. v. Waxed Products Co., 85 F.2d 75, 81 (2d Cir. 1936) (cellophane) ; Bayer Co. v.
United Drug Co., 272 Fed. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (aspirin); Lea v. Deakin, 15 Fed. Cas.
95, No. 8154 (N.D. Ill. 1879) (worcestershire sauce) ; Linoleum Mfg. Co. v. Nairn, 7 Ch.
D. 834 (1878) (linoleum). The distinction often made is between "specific" and "generic"
symbols. See Timberg, supra note 4, at 330-34; Isaacs, supra note 4, at 1220; Greenberg,
The "Patent" Claises of the Lanham Act, 38 TRADE4IMIARE: REP. 3 (1948). See also
AT-r'y GEN. REP. 255-59 (general discussion of public licensing in patents). Policy justi-
fications behind trademarks do not necessarily coincide with those of patents and hence
a different approach in the specific situation might be in order. See note 42 infra. For
a discussion of the general problem of patent and trademark decrees, see Stedman, Patent
and Trade-Mark Relief in Antitrust Judgments, 10 FED. B.J. 260 (1949).
23. In enjoining and restraining use of any law which allows exclusion, the court was
cognizant of the hardship such a denial might work upon the defendant and permitted
exclusions of those goods bearing trademarks copying or simulating those of defendant.
Final Judgment Orders 5-9, Brief for Lanvin Parfums, Inc., Statement as to Jurisdiction,
pp. 36a-37a, United States v. Guerlain, Inc., 155 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
24. The importer desiring to bring his goods into this country over the objection of
the American owner of a trademark registered with the Patent Office and certified with
the Treasury Department can proceed in any of three fashions: he can seek immediate
relief in the district court in the form of an order enjoining the trademark owner from
refusing permission to import the goods; he may request the district court to restrain the
Collector of Customs from barring importation; or he can appeal directly to the Collector
of Customs to allow importation. Note, 64 YALE L.J. 557 n.5 (1955). Furthermore, the
government is obviously not without remedy since it may act directly through the Collector
of Customs to protect the public interest. In the last two alternatives, the burden is cast
upon the American trademark owner to pursue judicial relief. Cf. Croton Watch Co. v.
Laughlin, 208 F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1953); Le Blume Import Co. v. Coty, 293 Fed. 344 (2d
Cir. 1923).
25. "Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of any-
thing forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor ... and shall recover threefold the
damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." 38
STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1952). The competitors task is simplified by the pro-
vision: "A final judgment or decree rendered .. . in any suit or proceeding in equity
brought by or on behalf of the United States under the antitrust laws... shall be prima
facie evidence against such defendant in any suit or proceeding brought by any other party
against such defendant under said laws as to all matters respecting which said judgment
would be an estoppel as between the parties thereto .... ." 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C.
§ 16 (1952). The aim of such suits is to enlist "the business public ...as allies of the
Government in enforcing the antitrust laws," 51 CONG. REc. 16319 (1914), by means
designed to give "the injured party ample damages for the wrong suffered," 51 id. at
9073. See A"r'Y GEx. REP. 379 (discussion and criticism of the treble damages provision).
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application of the section to serve as the basis of a damage award, the undesir-
ability of the court's reasoning would be magnified.2 6
More important, the court's treatment of section 526 as an exception to the
antitrust laws available only to independent firms impairs both 526 and anti-
trust policies.27 The loose construction of the term "affiliate" renders that class
of trademark owners as much in need of protection against fraud or breach of
contract by a foreign vendor as the independent.28 Even where the foreign
manufacturer seeks to protect its affiliate, denial of section 526 powers in effect
authorizes third-party purchasers to enter the American market and capitalize
26. See note 20 supra.
27. See notes 28-30 infra (dilutionary effect of the court's § 526 construction on trade-
mark protection); notes 31-33 infra (implications for antitrust enforcement). The evi-
dence is ambiguous on the section's applicability to affiliated firms. The legislative record
is scanty, § 526 being characterized as a "midnight amendment," 62 CONG. REc. 11602
(1922), with floor debate in the Senate limited to ten minutes, 62 id. at 11585. No mention
of the specific problem appears in these debates, although the avowed purpose of the
amendment was to protect the American who "bought" the trademark against breach of
contract or fraud. 62 id. at 11603-04. At least one commentator has concluded that the sec-
tion was not intended to protect affiliate firms. Note, 64 YALE L.J. 557 (1955). Presum-
ably, this conclusion is not acceptable to all writers. Derenberg, for example, has ques-
tioned in another context the ability of the Treasury Department to deny § 526 benefits
to "related" firms without legislative amendment. Derenberg, The Seventh Year of
Administration of the Lanham Trade-Mark Act of 1946, 44 TRADE-MARK REP. 991, 997
(1954). Despite its sponsorship of recent legislative attempts to eliminate § 526 protection
for affiliate firms, the Treasury Department maintains that such exclusion is "implicit in
existing law." Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary
on S. 2540, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 96 (1954). Defendant contended that congressional failure
to enact the amendment constituted legislative intent to protect affiliates, but the court
rejected the argument, noting that the amendment had been withdrawn rather than de-
feated. 155 F. Supp. at 82.
28. Affiliation as used by the court is virtually synonymous with dependence, regard-
less of degree. Even absent stock ownership in one company by the other, affiliation is
found. 155 F. Supp. at 96. The conclusion rests upon certain provisions allowing termi-
nation of the trademark agreement if the American company fails to conduct its business
in a "manner satisfactory" to the French manufacturer. Ibid. But provisions such as
these, designed to protect the manufacturer's goodwill, know how and secret formulae,
are commonplace in the business world and ought not to be used to establish affiliation.
See Note, 63 HARv. L. REv. 1010 (1950) (collecting material). Similar provisions are
imposed domestically upon automobile dealers and Coca-Cola licensees, yet such dealers
are not considered affiliates. See Kessler, Automobile Dealer Franchises: Vertical In-
tegration by Contract, 66 YALE L.J. 1135, 1146 (1957) ; Brown & Conwill, Autonobile
Manufacturer-Dealer Legislation, 57 CoLum. L. REv. 219, 221 (1957). See also The Coca-
Cola Bottling Co. v. The Coca-Cola Co., 269 Fed. 796 (D. Del. 1920).
Admittedly, a closer relationship exists in the cases of Corday and Guerlain than in
Lanvin. Compare 155 F. Supp. at 89, 92-93, with id. at 96. But in Guerlain as well as
Lanvin, the connection is not such that need for § 526 disappears. If the trademark agree-
ments are, as the court holds, subject to the absolute control by the foreign firm, more
rather than less need for protection of the American company exists. See note 2 supra;
cf. note 33 infra (trademark agreement, despite contention of nonownership, qualifies
for registration).
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on previously established goodwill. 29 The prospect of recoupment, moreover,
seems dim; for the supposed parent-subsidiary community of interest may,
under the Guerlain definition, be lacking. 3° Sherman Act policies are similarly
frustrated. The tacit holding that section 526 excepts independents from that
act sanctions a degree of monopoly power which purely domestic companies
may legally be unable to achieve.3' Nothing prevents a foreign enterprise from
granting an exclusive territorial distributorship to an independent American
firm which, invoking and insulated by the section, need not rely on the grantor
for subsequent enforcement even though a contract among domestic companies
to achieve the same distributive system might well be unlawful.3 2 Indeed, the
29. See notes 2-3 supra (legality under foreign law of restrictive arrangements de-
signed to prevent third parties from importing into the United States) ; notes 36-37 infra
and accompanying text (legality of the system under domestic law). For a discussion of
the trademark system as protective of goodwill, see note 4 supra.
30. Even if recotipment were forthcoming, it might not compensate for the losses
likely to be sustained if the American market were thrown open to other distributors. For
the vast price differential between Paris and New York makes doubtful the foreign firm's
capacity fully to reimburse its affiliate. But see Developments in the Law-Trade-Marks
and Unfair Competition, 68 HARV. L. REv. 314, 915-16 (.1955). Moreover, there is no
assurance that any reimbursement will be forthcoming. Admittedly, where close affinity
between the two firms exists, the foreign company might be willing to aid its affiliate,
especially since it might reap the benefits of some increased sales to other distributors at
higher prices. But under Guerlain, affiliation can be extremely distant. See note 28 supra.
31. The court was not faced with the question whether § 526 was an exception to
the Sherman Act in so far as it protected independent American businessmen. But the
nature of the court's approach to affiliate use of § 526 suggests that the court saw the
problem as admitting of only two solutions: either § 526 was unavailable or it afforded
complete exemption from antitrust rigors. In light of such alternatives, the affiliate was
denied the exception. 155 F. Stupp. at 82-83. The court assumed, however, explicitly in
a footnote and implicitly throughout, that § 526 was available to independent American
trademark owners, id. at 82-83 & n.17 , and presumably would exempt them, pro tanto,
from the Sherman Act. For a third possible construction of § 526, see notes 34-36
infra. In creating a double standard favoring independents, the court contradicted an
existing, much criticized, double standard involved in the traditional distinction between
loose-knit and close-knit combinations. For a general discussion and criticism of that
distinction and of recent attempts to abolish it, see Note, 66 YALE L.J. 1250 (1957) (col-
lecting authorities).
32. Exclusive territorial distributorships, also referred to as exclusive agencies, ex-
clusive sellers and exclusive representations, should not be confused with exclusive deal-
ing. The former mean that the distributor is to be the sole seller within a given market
while the latter refers to the arrangement where the dealer agrees not to sell goods of a
competitor of his supplier. Exclusive dealing is specifically outlawed by § 3 of the Clayton
Act where the effect may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a mo-
nopoly in any line of commerce. 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1952) ; see ATT'y
GEN. REP. 137-49. On the other hand, exclusive territorial distributorships are not speci-
fically proscribed by the Clayton Act. And despite the preclusion of competition implicit
in such an arrangement, the courts have refused to apply a per se illegality approach to
exclusive agencies under the Sherman Act, one court taking the position that, if anything,
per se legality was the proper standard. Packard Motor ,Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car
Co., 243 F.2d 418, 420 (D.C. Cir. 1957), reversing 135 F. Supp. 4 (D.D.C. 1955), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 822 (1957). Generally, however, the rule of reason under § 1 of the Sher-
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exclusive agency is superfluous; upon registration of the trademark, the Ameri-
man Act has been applied. Thus, Judge Frank, in Bascom Launder Corp. v. Telecoin Corp.,
204 F.2d 331, 335 (2d Cir. 1953), observed that an exclusive distributorship will be found
invalid if the producer has a monopoly and/or the arrangement is without reasonable
economic basis and unduly restrains trade. And Judge Thomsen, while upholding the
particular arrangement before him, said: "Of course the agreement would be invalid...
if there was any agreement which tended unreasonably to -restrain interstate commerce or
to create a monopoly. But a monopoly in that sense would have to be a real monopoly
in the commodity and not the natural monopoly which a manufacturer has in his own
product. Unless the manufacturer dominates the market, he has a right to give a dealer
an actual monopoly, let alone a 'virtual' monopoly, in the sale of his particular make or
brand in a particular territory." Schwing Motor Co. v. Hudson Sales Corp., 138 F. Supp.
899, 906 (D. Md.), aff'd per curiam, 239 F.2d 176 (4th Cir. 1.956), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
823 (1957).
The basic justification for an exclusive agency is that it protects a source of supply for
the distributor and a market outlet for the manufacturer. The leading case in the field
upheld the system. Boro Hall Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 37 F. Supp. 999 (S.D.N.Y.
1941), aff'd, 124 F.2d 822 (2d Cir.), rehearing denied, 130 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1942), cert.
denied, 317 U.S. 695 (1943). Some doubt was cast upon the legality of such systems gen-
erally by United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 719 (1944), affirm-
ing by at equally divided Court 45 F. Supp. 387, 398-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) (distributorship
upheld). Recent automobile cases finding the distributorships valid and the restraint not
unreasonable include Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., supra; Schwing
Motor Co. v. Hudson Sales Corp., supra. For a discussion of the problem in the automobile
industry, see Kessler, Automobile Dealer Franchises: Vertical Integration by Contract,
66 YALE L.J. 1135, 1147-48, 1157-59 (1957). On the general problem of exclusive dis-
tributorships, see Arr'Y GEN. REP. 27-29 (concluding that where it is reasonably neces-
sary to protect lawful business purposes and the effect is "not unreasonably to foreclose
competition from the dealer's market" such an arrangement is valid) ; Rifkind, Division
of Territories, in VAN CisE & DUNN, How To COMPLY WITH THE A'riTRuST LAWS 131-
36 (1954) (suggesting that the very division of territory may be illegal in so far as price-
fixing is promoted) ; Seitz, Exclusive Arrangements and Refusal To Deal Problems, 11
VAND. L. REv. 85, 93-95 (1957) ; Note, 40 MINN. L. Rav. 853 (1956) ; see United States v.
Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., 105 F. Supp. 215, 245 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (upholding an
exclusive distributorship as not established "with a view to limiting or restraining com-
petition"). See also United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 344 U.S. 495, 523 (1948) (noth-
ing in United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947), "supports the theory that
all exclusive dealing [distributorship] arrangements are illegal per se") ; Coca-Cola Co.
v. J. G. Butler & Sons, 229 Fed. 224 (E.D. Ark. 1916) (reasonable as means of protecting
trademark goodwill and product's quality). The Federal Trade Commission has, in recent
years, secured a series of consent decrees enjoining continuation of such arrangements.
See, e.g., United States v. J. P. Seeburg Corp., 1957 Trade Cas. ff 68613 (N.D. Ill.);
United States v. National Ice and Cold Storage Co., 1954 Trade Cas. 1 67660 ('S.D. Cal.);
United States v. Bearing Distributors Co., 1952-53 Trade Cas. ff 67595 (W.D. Mo. 1953);
United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 1952-53 Trade Cas. ff 67510 (N.D. Ohio 1953).
The effectuation of the structure is usually a threefold process: (1) establishment of
the dealer's area; (2) contracting with the producer not to set up another dealership with-
in the area; and (3) the optional provision of extracting covenants from other dealers
not to sell in one another's territory. Enforcement against violating dealers usually takes
the form of cancellation of the franchise, a form of refusal to deal which the courts have
generally been willing to sustain. See Comment, 58 YA.E LJ. 1121 (1949) (refusal to
sell problems generally).
In analysis and evaluation of the law of exclusive distributorship, a distinction is some-
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can firm can invoke section 526 to make itself exclusive agent or, for that
matter, entirely exclude the foreign product from the American market.33
To implement section 526 purposes yet subserve antitrust policy, a construc-
tion should be adopted which denies the section substantive status as a Sher-
man Act exception but extends its adjective remedial features to all American
firms purchasing foreign marks.34 So construed, section 526 rights, like in-
times drawn between arrangements in which the manufacturer refrains from dealing with
other buyers within his distributor's prescribed area and those in which the distributor,
in return, agrees not to sell outside of his assigned territory. See Seitz, supra at 93-95.
However, the same factors would appear equally relevant in both systems: the producer's
market position nationally and locally, the scope of the distributor's territory and the de-
gree of competition within that territory. Perhaps, the difference is that the former will
be declared lawful if ancillary to a valid business purpose, unless an attempt to monop-
olize can be shown, while the latter will fall if commerce is unreasonably restricted within
the assigned territory, i.e., if insufficient market substitutes are available. Distributorships
of the latter category in which the restraint was deemed reasonable are Boro Hall Corp.
v. General Motors Corp., supra; Tillar v. Cole Motor Car Co., 246 Fed. 831 (5th Cir.
1917), cert. denied, 247 U.S. 511 (1918). But despite the theoretical distinction, resting
perhaps on the right of every producer acting unilaterally to select those with whom he
wishes to deal absent an attempt to monopolize, Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342
U.S. 143 (1951); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211
(1951), courts have, even when faced with the former distributorship, evaluated the rea-
sonableness of the restraint even if it is ancillary, see Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster
'Motor Car Co., supra at 420; Schwing Motor Co. v. Hudson Sales Corp., supra at 907.
33. See Hamilton Watch Co. v. Hamilton Chain Co., 43 F. Supp. 85, 89 (D.R.I.
1942) (registration to prevent threatened importations from Switzerland).
Although the right to register with the Patent Office was not ultimately challenged
in Guerlain, the issue was mentioned in the government's brief. Post-Trial Brief for Plain-
tiff, p. 20 n.3, United States v. Guerlain, Inc., 155 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). The
contention was that, at least in so far as Lanvin and Guerlain assignments were concerned,
insufficient rights had been transferred to qualify for § 42 registration as a prerequisite to
§ 526 filing. Although the assignments were, on their face, without limitation, they were
terminable according to various provisions. These provisions, the government argued,
negated American ownership of the mark and hence barred registration. Ibid. Where the
applicant is merely a sales agent for the foreign producer, registration will be denied, the
applicant's interest failing to meet the standard of "control" over the nature and quality
of the goods required by § 45 of the Lanham Act, 60 STAT. 443 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1127
(1952). See, e.g., Ex parte E. Leitz, Inc., 105 U.S.P.Q. 480 (1955) ; Roger & Gallet v.
Janmarie, Inc., 107 U.S.P.Q. 295 (1955), same result on rehearing, 109 US.P.Q. 16
(1956). See also 62 CONG. REc. 11605 (1922). Even where control exists, the requirement
of ownership may be lacking. See Derenberg, The Impact of the Antitrust Laws on Trade-
Marks in Foreign Commerce, 27 N.Y.U.L. REv. 414, 428-29 (1952). But cf. Scandinavia
Belting Co. v. Asbestos & Rubber Works, Inc., 257 Fed. 937 (2d Cir. 1919) (assignment
for twenty-seven years entitled to register) ; Georg Jensen & Wendel, A/S v. Georg Jen-
sen Handmade Silver, Inc., 27 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 1109, 111. F.2d 169 (1940) (twenty-year
assignment valid for registration purposes). On the general problem of trademark licensing
and assignments under the Lanham Act, see Shniderman, Trade-Mark Licensing-A Saga
of Fantasy and Fact, 14 LAw & CONTEmP. PRoB. 248 (1949); Timberg, Trade-Marks,
Monopoly, and the Restraint of Competition, 14 id. at 325, 353-58; Developments in the
Law, supra note 30, at 867-74.
34. Under this construction, no distinction would be made between independent and
affiliate firms; § 526 would be available to both. But utilization of the section as an ex-
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fringement suits or contract actions, could not be used to monopolize the mar-
ket or unreasonably restrain competition.35 As in domestic exclusive agency
cases, proper inquiry would weigh the actual impairment of competition against
the business justification for the restraint.36 In Guerlain, for example, the
exclusive territorial distributorship to which trademark licensing and invoca-
tion of section 526 were ancillary might be deemed a section one violation. 37 If
ception to the antitrust laws would be denied regardless of the company's status. Com-
mentators have confined their attention to the problem of who may invoke § 526 and as-
sumed that those permitted to do so are exempted from the Sherman Act. See, e.g.,
Developments in the Law, supra note 30, at 913-20; Note, 64 YALz L.J. 557 (1955). Yet
nothing in the section itself or congressional intent necessitates such a conclusion. What
limited intent can be gleaned from the debates shows that the specific problem was never
seriously considered. It does appear, however, that Congress felt it was enacting a remedial
and not a substantive section. 62 CONG. REc. 11602-05 (1922). Moreover, settled policy
dictates that exceptions to the antitrust laws be recognized only when explicitly made by
Congress and even then be narrowly construed. "The intention of the legislature to repeal
'must be clear and manifest' .... There must be 'a positive repugnancy between the pro-
visions of the new law, and those of the old; and even then the old law is repealed by
implication only pro tanto to the extent of repugnancy.'" United States v. Borden Co.,
308 U.S. 188, 198-99 (1939). For examples of specific exemptions, see United States v.
E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 388 n.14 (1956).
35. Enforcement of contracts in restraint of trade had traditionally been denied under
both the common law and antitrust legislation. See, e.g., United States v. Addyston Pipe
& Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271, 278-91 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899) (discussion
of common law) ; 6 ComRm, Co ;RAcrs §§ 1379-96 (1951) (same) ; 5 WILISTON, CON-
TRACTS §§ 1628-64A (rev. ed. 1937) (same). Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides:
"Every contract .... in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, or with
foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal." 26 STAT. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1 (1952). See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) (rule of reason) ;
United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927) (certain contracts per se
unreasonable).
Infringement remedies producing antitrust violations have generally been refused. See
Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942) (denying plaintiff an injunc-
tion to restrain infringement of its patents until it ceased activities constituting antitrust
violation). But see Vitagraph, Inc. v. Grobaski, 46 F.2d 813, 814 (W.D. Mich. 1931)
(antitrust violation no defense to copyright suit) ; Radio Corp. v. Hygrade Sylvania Corp.,
10 F. Supp. 879 (D.N.J. 1934) (antitrust violation no defense to claim of patent infringe-
ment).
36. See note 32 supra for treatment of domestic exclusive distributorship problems.
Evaluation of the actual impairment of competition initially requires definition of the
relevant market. Then, the position of the distributive system within that market would
be ascertained and the scope of the restraint examined. In considering the business justi-
fication for the arrangement, one major factor enters which is absent from the parallel
domestic situation: the problem of jurisdiction and the nonavailability of the other party.
See notes 2-3 supra. For discussion of the business justifications of trade restraints, see
Bascom Launder Corp. v. Telecoin Corp., 204 F.2d 331, 335 n.5 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
345 U.S. 994 (1953) ; Brosious v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 155 F.2d 99, 101-02 (3d Cir. 1946).
37. Reliance need not be placed upon distorting market definitions; even assuming
interbrand competition, the arrangement may constitute an unreasonable restraint of trade.
For an exclusive territorial distributorship spanning the entire country restricts com-
petition to a far greater degree than a system in which each major city has at least one
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so, employment of section 526 would be barred, as it would in the absence of
an exclusive arrangement, if a market structure domestically unachievable
through contract or infringement actions would otherwise result.38 Thus
limited, section 526 would endanger competition only where domestic antitrust
law is inadequate.
Antitrust decisions may be criticized as failing to confine trademark grants.
No court has specifically held illegal a monopoly caused solely by a trade-
mark.3 9 Many opinions have referred to the "natural and complete monopoly"
each owner has over his particular product and to his right to buttress that
monopoly with a mark.40  Such language need not, however, imply that no
section two violation would be found when through the effect of trademarks the
owner's product becomes sufficiently differentiated from all others to constitute
a separate market. It only establishes a right to identify goods as one's own
distributorship. Cf. automobile cases cited note 32 supra. Admittedly, the courts have at
times held applicable the law of the nation where the alleged violations occurred. See
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909) ; note 2 supra (discuss-
ing foreign law). But the weight of authority states that extraterritorial activity must
be evaluated in terms of its effect upon the American markets as judged by domestic anti-
trust standards. See Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951) ;
United 'States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.,S. 106 (1911). For discussion, see ATrr'y
GEN. REP. 66-77; Carlston, Antitrust Policy Abroad, 49 Nw. U.L. Rav. 569, 713 (1954-
55); Hale & Hale, Monopdly Abroad: The Antitrust Laws and Commerce in Foreign
Areas, 31 TEXAs L. Ray. 493 (1953); Haight, International Law and Extraterritorial
Application of the Antitrust Laws, 63 YALE L.J. 639 (1954) ; Whitney, Sonrces of Conflict
Between International Law and the Antitrust Laws, 63 id. at 655; Note, 42 CORNELL L.Q.
390 (1957) (collecting authorities and cases).
38. Such a construction would be necessary to avoid wholesale evasion of antitrust
strictures. Cf. the concept of "conscious parallelism" discussed in Arr'Y Gm. REP. 36-42
(collecting cases).
39. The precise problem has never 'been decided because no case has arisen in which
a trademark differentiated a product sufficiently to constitute it a separate market or to
give the owner monopoly power over a broader relevant market. Nor are cases like
United States v. Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945), relevant; although trade-
marks may have existed, the monopoly power exerted was neither caused nor supported
by the trademarks. See also cases cited note 44 infra, (trademark activities declared
illegal as failing to justify otherwise illicit practices). More in point are cases invalidat-
ing trademarks identified, in the public mind, with the general commodity. See note 22
supra. These cases did not, however, involve antitrust prosecution.
40. See, e.g., ,Schwing Motor Co. v. Hudson Sales Corp., 138 F. Supp. 899, 902 (D.
Md. 1956) ("Every manufacturer has a natural and complete monopoly of his particular
product, especially when sold under his own private brand or trade name.") ; United States
v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 392-93 (1956) : "A retail seller may
have in one sense a monopoly on certain trade . . . because no one else makes a product
of just the quality or attractiveness of his product, as for example in cigarettes. Thus one
can theorize that we have monopolistic competition in every nonstandardized commodity
with each manufacturer having power over the price and production of his own product.
However, this power that, let us say, automobile or soft-drink manufacturers have over
their trademarked products is not the power that makes an illegal monopoly."
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within the confines of the antitrust laws. 41 Supported by the historical dis-
41. Past antitrust decisions have concerned trademarked products which had readily
available substitutes and hence were part of a broader market in which no monopolization
was established. See cases cited note 32 supra. Trademarks have upon occasion been
upheld as sanctioning a legal monopoly similar in effect to a patent grant. Coca-Cola Co.
v. J. G. Butler & Sons, 229 Fed. 224, 232 (E.D. Ark. 1916). See also A. Bourjois & Co.
v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689, 692 (1923); Le Blume Import Co. v. Coty, 293 Fed. 344, 349
(2d Cir. 1923). But sounder reasoning has distinguished the two. See note 42 infra. More-
over, the bulk of authority recognizes that if a trademark grants a monopoly, it does so
not over the product but only over the mark, and even that grant might be revoked if the
mark monopolizes the relevant market. See, e.g., In re General Petroleum Corp., 49 F.2d
966, 968 (C.C.P.A. (Patents) 1931) ("Trade-mark ownership carries with it a monopoly
upon the mark, but does not, of itself, carry with it the right of a monopoly upon the product
or goods to which the mark is applied."); United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248
U.S. 90, 98 (1918) ("In truth, a trade-mark confers no monopoly whatever in a proper
sense, but is merely a convenient means for facilitating the protection of one's good-will
in trade by placing a distinguishing mark or symbol-a commercial signature-upon the
merchandise or the package in which it is sold.") ; Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.)
311, 323 (1871) ("No one can claim protection for the exclusive use of a trade-mark or
trade-name which would practically give him a monopoly in the sale of any goods other
than those produced or made by himself. If he could, the public would be injured rather
than protected, for competition would be destroyed."); note 22 supra (nonantitrust
cases in which trademarks have been publicly dedicated when coalescence between mark
and commodity occurs). See also United States v. General Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753,
852 (D.N.J. 1949) (suggestion that successful exploitation of "Mazda" trademark might
result in its becoming synonymous with the market).
Although decisions appear to vacillate, the weight of authority does not allow trademarks
to justify otherwise illegal activities. Restrictive agreements ancillary to trademarks have
at times been upheld, not because trademarks confer per se protection but because the
restraints have been deemed reasonable by § 1 standards.
Price-fixing: Valid if pursuant to the Miller-Tydings Act, 50 STAT. 693 (1937), 15
U.S.C. § 1 (1952); 66 STAT. 632 (1952), 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1952). Absent such exemption,
the antitrust laws prohibit resale price maintenance. See Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John
D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 407-08 (1911.). And trademarks do not provide im-
munity from the common-law policy against restraint of trade. John D. Park & Sons Co.
v. Hartman, 153 Fed. 24, 38 (6th Cir. 1907), cert. denied, 212 U.S. 588 (1908) ; Note, 64
YALE L.J. 426 (1955). See also United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S.
305, 310 (1956), quoting United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 721
(1944) : "A distributor of a trade-marked article may not lawfully limit by agreement, ex-
press or implied, the price at which or the person to whom its purchaser may resell, except as
the seller moves along the route which is marked by the Miller-Tydings Act."
Covenants not to compete: Thoms v. Sutherland, 52 F.2d 592 (3d Cir. 1931) (agree-
ment not to compete pursuant to sale of business, its goodwill and trademarks, valid).
But see United States v. Holophane Co., 119 F. Stzpp. 114 (S.D. Ohio 1954), aff'd per
curiam, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (market allocation invalid).
Exclusive dealing: Pick Mfg. Co. v. General Motors Corp., 80 F.2d 641 (7th Cir.
1935) (contracts valid to protect trademark goodwill and because no substantial lessening
of competition shown), aff'd, 299 U.S. 3 (1936) (lawfulness of arrangement predicated
solely upon lack of substantial lessening of competition). But see Dictograph Products,
Inc. v. FTC, 217 F.2d 821, 826 (2d Cir. 1954) (disapproving lower court rationale in
Pick case).
Tying arrangements: Wilbert W. Haase Co. v. Sultz, 97 U.S.P.Q. 258, 262 (W.D.
N.Y. 1953) (valid as a "reasonable requirement" for protecting the mark). But see United
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tinction between trademarks and patents, 42 this interpretation has been im-
plicitly recognized by the courts in exclusive distributorship cases: a trade-
mark has furnished no immunity, and restraints caused solely by its existence
States v. Switzer Bros., Inc., 1952-53 Trade Cas. I[ 67598 (N.D. Cal. 1953) (consent decree
enjoining tie-ins).
Refusals ta sell: Green v. Electric Vacuum Cleaner Co., 132 F.2d 312, 315 (6th Cir.
1942), cert. dismissed, 319 U.S. 777 (1943) (where reconditioners are improperly using
trademark, refusal to sell legal). See also Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Ma-
terial Co., 273 U.S. 359, 375 (1927) (motivation of refusal to sell subject to jury deter-
mination) ; United States v. Klearflax Linen Looms, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 32, 39 (D. Minn.
1945) (refusal to sell for purpose of wrongful monopoly unlawful).
Price discrimination: Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 22 F.T.C. 232 (1936) (order to
cease and desist from selling at different prices to different consumers the same item
under different trademarks), set aside, 101 F.2d 620 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S.
557 (1939). But see Upited States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 1943 Trade Cas. ff 62334 (E.D.
Pa.) (consent decree enjoining plastic manufacturer from selling to general commercial
users at substantially lower price than that given to special dental trade under a different
mark).
Domestic monopoly: United States v. A. B. Dick Co., 1948 Trade Cas. ff 62233 (N.D.
Ohio) (consent decree requiring defendant's dedication of trademark "Mimeograph") ;
United States v. Gamewell Co., 1948 Trade Cas. f[ 62236 (D. Mass.) (consent decree
enjoining defendant from threatening to bring or bringing suit based on trademark alleged-
ly acquired to secure a monopoly) ; United States v. American Optical Co., 1948 Trade
Cas. ff 62308 (S.D.N.Y.) (same).
Division of world markets: Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S.
593 (1951) (division of world markets not ancillary to trademark licensing and unlaw-
ful) ; United States v. Bayer Co., 135 F. Supp. 65, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (same). For a
description of trademark cartel systems and how they function, see Handler, Trade-Marks
and Anti-Trust Laws, 38 TRADE-MARK REP. 387, 389 (1948).
Antitrust decrees recognize, moreover, that trademarks must not be allowed to perpetuate
market dominance. See, e.g., United States v. General Elec. Co., 115 F. Supp. 835, 858-
59 (D.N.J. 1953) (final judgment enjoining defendant from (1) using a certain trade-
mark in connection with more than 1% of its lamp sales during any one calendar year,
and (2) for three years licensing any trademark except where the goods were manufac-
tured for defendant) ; United States v. Switzer Bros., Inc., supra; United States v. Per-
mutit Co., 1.951 Trade Cas. fr 62888 (S.D.N.Y.) (ordering defendant to adopt a trademark
distinct from that of foreign companies, to compete with such foreign companies and to
refrain from restrictive licensing practices).
Finally, the Trade-Mfark Act of 1946 penalizes uses of trademarks "to violate the anti-
trust laws of the United States." 60 STAT. 427, 439 (1946), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1115(b) (7)
(1952) ; see 92 CONG. Rac. 7872 (1946).
42. Despite limited judicial equation of trademarks with patents or copyrights, most
cases have tarefully distinguished between the two types of protection and the policies
underlying each. See, e.g., Canal Co. v. Clark, supra note 41, at 322; Mishawaka Rubber
& Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S. S. Kresge Co., 119 F.2d 316, 323 (6th Cir. 1941), rev'd, 316
U.S. 203 (1942) ; United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284, 315-16
(N.D. Ohio 1949).
Historically, the two have been treated differently. The Constitution provides for the
protection of copyrights and patents but says nothing of trademarks. U.S. CONsT. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 8. Yet trademarks were protected by the common law both in England and the
United States. See, e.g., Southern v. How, Pop. 143, 79 Eng. Rep. 1243 (K.B. 1656) ;
Taylor v. Canpenter, 23 Fed. Cas. 742, No. 13784 (C.C.D. Mass. 1844); Thomson v.
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have not been discounted in determining whether the total structure was un-
reasonable under section one of the Sherman Act.43
Even if domestic law is in fact lax in its treatment of trademarks, the ap-
parent remedy is not penalization of American affiliates trading abroad but
strengthening of antitrust restrictions. Thus, if the exclusive territorial dis-
tributorship established in Guerlain unduly restrained competition, it should
have been no more enforceable under section 526 than through a contract
action.44 Admittedly, the government's failure to bring charges under section
one of the Sherman Act increased the difficulty of reaching a desirable result on
correct grounds.4 5 Still, dismissal of the cause for failure to meet section two
standards would not have prevented entry of a finding that section 526 was
applicable to affiliates and did not amount to an exception to the antitrust
Winchester, 36 Mass. (19 Pick.) 214 (1837). Since a specific constitutional grant is lack-
ing, the federal government presumably derives its power to regulate trademarks from
the commerce clause. For a history on the development of trademark protection by the
courts, see SCHECHTER, HisT0RicAL FOUNDATIONS oF TRADE-MARK LAw (1925).
The justifications for trademarks differ sharply from those for patents and copyrights.
As one commentator has stated: "Patents and copyrights stress standards of inventiveness
and artistic expression and are hallmarks of originality; they call for a high level of
understanding and sagacity on the part of both their utilizers and their audience. Success-
ful trade-marks, on the other hand, are largely matters of giving conventional forms of
syllabification and ornamentation a reiteration prolonged and attractive enough to evoke
a conditioned reflex on the part of their audience-the so-called consumer response." Tim-
berg, Trade-Marks, Monopoly, and the Restraint of Competitions, 14 LAw & CorNzMP.
PRoB. 323 (1949).
Finally, there are important practical differences between the two classes. Thus, since
trademark protection is considered an outgrowth of the law of unfair competition, it is
a right appurtenant to property, not property itself. Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240
U.S. 403, 412-14 (1916). More important, a trademark, unlike a copyright or a patent,
is not a right in gross, United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., supra note 41;
accordingly, the owner may not make a negative, prohibitory use of it as a monopoly,
see Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 424 (1908);
Bement v. National Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70, 90 (1902) ; United States v. American Bell
Tel. Co., 167 U.S. 224, 250 (1897). On the other hand, trademarks extend in perpetuity
while patents and copyrights are limited to a term of years by statute. 35 U.S.C. § 154
(1952) (seventeen-year limit on patents); 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1952) (twenty-eight year
copyright protection, renewable for a similar period).
To allow an indefinite monopoly from trademarks when copyrights and patents are
limited in time would, of course, be anomalous. Cf. Timberg, supra. Moreover, allowing
such a procedure would frustrate the patent system since inventors could secure trade-
marks which would perpetuate the monopoly position acquired through the patent and
identified, in the public mind, with the trademark. See United States v. General Elec.
Co., 82 F. Supp. 753, 847-52 (D.N.J. 1949). For an exhaustive survey of trademarks,
see Developments in the Law, supra note 30.
43. See note 32 supra.
44. See note 35 supra.
45. The government alleged "an attempt to monopolize and a monopolization of the
importation into and sale within the United States" of the trademarked perfumes and toilet
articles. 155 F. Supp. at 79. Nothing in the record indicates that the Department of
Justice considered an allegation of a contract or combination in restraint of trade.
1958] 1129
1130 THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
laws. 46 Appropriate dictum implying the existence of a section one violation bar-
ring use of section 526 could have been uttered and most likely would have
sufficed to prevent further exclusions. 47 In all events, competitors would have
been free to contest exclusion as unduly restraining trade. 48 In attempting to
eliminate this additional step, the court not only distorted market definition
but denied the protection legitimately given affiliates by section 526 and im-
plied, to the ultimate detriment of antitrust policy, that the section might serve
as an exception to the Sherman Act.
46. Before reaching the monopolization question, the court would naturally consider
whether the Sherman Act applied to defendant. This would necessitate evaluation of the
§ 526 defense pursuant to which the desired construction might have been rendered.
47. In denying that § 526 was a Sherman Act exception and in construing it available
to affiliate firms, the court might have made reference, by hypotheticals, to what it deemed
the proper limits of utilization. Such dictum might in turn serve as a basis for customs
officials denying, on their own initiative or pursuant to competing importers' requests, use
of § 526 to defendant. See note 24 supra.
48. See ibid.
